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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HERBERT McCARVEL, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
BLAKE T. HERBERT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 950552-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County in a domestic relations matter. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Are the trial court's findings sufficient where the trial court 
determined that Husband's arguments were not supported by the evidence presented 
and that equity required a finding in favor of Wife based on the conduct of the 
parties and the express language of the decree of divorce? The issues presented in 
this appeal involve discretionary rulings by the trial court, and "findings of fact and 
conclusions of law will support a judgment, though they are very general, where they 
in most respects follow the allegation of the pleadings." Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) (citing Cain v. Stewart. 152 P. 465 (Utah 1915)). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that Wife was 
not estopped from seeking one-half of the current equity in the home, where it was 
undisputed that the parties had agreed to some modification of the divorce decree, 
Husband made improvements to the home in reliance upon his understanding that 
Wife did not claim any of the increased equity, and Wife did not respond to letters 
which confirmed that belief? This issue, presented here by the Appellant and raised 
in Husband's Answer (R. 61 f 9) and in Husband's trial memorandum (R. 134-130), 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 
65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that Wife's 
claims were not barred by laches, where Wife waited over five years before bringing 
her claim for part of the equity in the home and where Husband had made 
improvements to the home in reliance on his understanding, which had been clearly 
communicated to Wife, that he would only be obligated to pay the remaining balance 
of the $10,000.00 provided in the decree of divorce? This issue, presented here by 
the Appellant and raised in Husband's Answer (R. 61 I 9) and in Husband's trial 
memorandum (R. 127-126), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Papanikolas Brothers 
Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the home equity 
split as of the time of sale or appraisal in order to prevent Husband from profiting 
from his own inaction? This issue, presented here by the Appellant and raised in 
Husband's trial memorandum (R. 125-123), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Wife is not aware of any constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules 
or regulations which are solely determinative of the appeal or of central importance 
to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were divorced by a decree entered October 21, 1987. (R. 53-51.) 
Paragraph five of the decree stated the following: 
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Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff her equity in the 
home, namely, Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
within eighteen (18) months, namely, March 1989. In 
the event such amount is not paid, the parties are to 
sell the home and the net equity is to be divided 
between the parties. Each party is to sign appropriate 
documents to sell the home and each party agrees to 
fully cooperate in the selling of such home. 
Furthermore, the decree ordered each party to pay his or her own debts and Wife 
was ordered to take Husband's name off her credit cards. By May of 1989, Husband 
had not paid Wife the $10,000.00 for her equity in the home (R. 193, 220) and Wife 
still had outstanding credit card bills (R. 230-31, 195-96). 
On May 16, 1989, Wife's attorney sent Husband's attorney a letter seeking 
Wife's share of the equity pursuant to the decree of divorce. (R. 119-18.) Pursuant 
to a subsequent telephone conversation between the parties, Husband offered to pay 
Wife's credit card bills and she agreed to accept such payment as offset against her 
share of equity in the marital home. The parties disagree as to the amount of Wife's 
share of the equity and when it was to be paid to her. (R. 193, 209, 220, 228-29.) 
On June 5, 1989 Husband sent a letter to his attorney indicating that the 
parties had resolved the home equity issue, but omitting to explain the specifics of the 
parties' agreement. (R. 116.) On June 12, 1989 Husband's attorney sent a letter to 
Wife's attorney expressing his understanding that the parties had resolved the 
problems concerning the home equity issue; this letter also failed to delineate the 
terms of the agreement. (R. 114.) 
On July 21, 1992 Wife sent Husband a letter asserting her claim to 
$25,000.00 as her share of the equity in the house (R. 73), and Husband's attorney 
responded with a letter dated July 31, 1992 which stated Husband's belief that the 
parties' 1989 oral agreement allowed him to pay Wife's credit card bills and pay her 
the remainder of the $10,000.00 amount specified in the original decree of divorce. 
(R. 71-70.) On September 16, 1994 Wife filed an order to show cause seeking 
resolution of the home equity issue. 
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As a result of the parties' 1989 agreement, Husband made payments of 
$6,077.04 on Wife's credit cards (R. 110, 226) over a period of approximately 5 1/2 
years (R. 229, 234). Husband made no attempt to sell the marital home or to pay 
Wife anything further for her share of the equity in the home. Husband continued 
paying the mortgage on the marital home and made improvements to the home in the 
approximate amount of $6,000.00. (R. 223, 231.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should uphold the trial court's order in this case. Wife's failure 
to respond to the July 31, 1992 letter from Husband's attorney was not sufficient to 
deny her claim based on arguments of estoppel or laches. Husband had no reason to 
rely on Wife's silence alone as justification for making improvements to the home and 
failing to make arrangements to pay Wife's share of the equity. Furthermore, Wife 
has sustained injuries equal to or greater than those sustained by Husband as a result 
of the delay in this matter and the trial court correctly refused to compound Wife's 
injuries by sustaining Husband's allegations of estoppel and laches. 
Given the express language of the decree of divorce, the trial court did not 
err in ordering the home to be valued at the time of the hearing. The decree states 
that, if Husband failed to pay Wife's $10,000.00 equity as of March 1989 the home 
should be sold and the net equity divided between the parties. 
The parties had no meeting of the minds concerning the amount of Wife's 
share of equity in the home against which Husband's payments of Wife's credit card 
debts should be made. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling in accordance 
with the language of the decree. Furthermore, because Husband's understanding of 
the agreement would have been to Wife's detriment and against the express language 
of the decree, the trial court was both reasonable and equitable in determining that 
Wife was entitled to one-half the net equity in the home, less certain offsets, as of the 
date of sale or appraisal. 
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In addition, the trial court's findings of fact conform to the pleadings and the 
evidence in this matter and therefore form an adequate basis for its order. The 
decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION IS ADEQUATELY 
SUPPORTED BY ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
Husband argues that the trial court failed to resolve the factual issues 
disputed in this matter, specifically (1) whether Husband's payment of Wife's credit 
card debts was to be offset against the $10,000 equity amount specified in the decree 
of divorce if the equity were paid by May 1989 or against the net equity in the home 
should the equity be divided at some later time, as provided in the decree; and (2) 
when the remainder of Wife's equity would be payable to her. Husband argues that, 
if the trial court accepted Wife's understanding of the parties' agreement, it should 
have also specifically considered the effect of Wife's failure to respond to letters from 
Husband's attorney addressing these issues. Husband further argues that the trial 
court failed to state its reasons for denying Husband's claims of estoppel, laches and 
waiver. 
Utah law prohibits the setting aside of a trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are determined to be clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that "[findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that, in order to successfully challenge 
the correctness of a trial court's findings, "an appellant must first marshall all the 
evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court below." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989) 
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(citations omitted). The Reid court then went on to hold that "[a] finding attacked as 
lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed 'clearly erroneous' only if we 
conclude that the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence." Id- at 899-900 
(citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that substantial compliance with Rule 
52(a) is sufficient to establish the sufficiency of a court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. In an earlier case in which the parties to a divorce disputed the 
lower court's division of property, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[fjindings 
should be limited to the ultimate facts and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the evidence to support the judgment, they 
will be regarded as sufficient, though not as full and as complete as might be desired. 
Pearson v. Pearson. 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) (citations omitted). The 
Pearson court went on to hold that f,[t]he fact that the Findings are not absolutely 
comprehensive is not of such significance as would warrant reversal." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that, "[although findings should 
be made on all material subordinate and ultimate factual issues, it is not necessary 
that a court resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues." Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 
159, 160 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). In Sorenson. the issue on appeal was the 
sufficiency of the trial court's findings and conclusions holding that an attorney-client 
relationship had not existed between the parties. The trial court's findings on this 
issue stated that "[i]t is the opinion of the court, after review and consideration of the 
evidence that the claim of plaintiff of the relationship of attorney client is not 
supported by the weight of credible evidence and the court finds said issue in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff." Id. The Utah Supreme Court determined that, 
"[t]he trial court's finding, although conclusory in nature on the material issue of the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship, is sufficient. Although more detailed 
factual findings would have been appropriate, thereby making explicit that which is 
necessarily implicit in the court's findings, such additional findings . . . were not 
mandatory." Id. 
6 
As to Husband's argument here that the trial court's findings of fact are 
insufficient for failing to state reasons for denying Husband's claims of estoppel, 
laches and waiver, the Utah Supreme Court has previously determined that 
"[substantial compliance with Rule 52(a) does not . . . require that the trial court 
negative every allegation contained in the pleadings; rather, the Rule is satisfied if, 
from the findings it (the trial court) makes, there can be no reasonable inference 
other than that it must have found against such allegations." Parks v. Zions First Nat. 
Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). 
In the case now before this Court, the trial court's findings substantially 
comply with the requirements of Rule 52(a). The findings reflect the trial court's 
evaluation of Husband's understanding of the parties' oral agreement to be contrary 
to the express language of the decree of divorce as well as being inequitable and 
against Wife's best interests, thereby making it an unreasonable and unlikely 
agreement for Wife to have made. Based on these findings set forth by the trial 
court, it is clear that the trial court found against Husband's allegations of estoppel, 
waiver and laches and no reasonable inference can be made otherwise. 
Although the trial court's findings may have been less explicit than this court 
might wish, the findings clearly conform to the parties' pleadings and the evidence 
and do not mandate reversal or remand. 
POINT II 
WIFE IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING HALF 
OF THE APPRECIATED VALUE OF THE HOME 
Husband argues that Wife should be estopped from claiming half of the 
appreciated value of the home as her share of the equity pursuant to the decree of 
divorce because of Wife's failure to dispute Husband's understanding of the party's 
1989 oral agreement as communicated to her through Husband's attorney. Husband 
argues that Wife had a duty to respond and refute the claims Husband's attorney 
communicated to Wife, and that Husband acted in reliance on Wife's silence and was 
subsequently injured by her inaction. 
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Utah case law regarding estoppel states that equitable estoppel is a highly 
fact-dependent question which cannot be reviewed de novo in every case because the 
reviewing court cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of law through a 
course of such decisions. Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, 
Utah case law clearly holds that more than mere silence is needed to justify another 
party's reliance. 
In State v. Irizarrv, 893 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cited by Husband, 
the Utah Court of Appeals held that a mother was estopped from seeking 
reimbursement for back child support when the mother had not only failed to take 
any overt action to require the father to pay child support but had also communicated 
to a mutual friend that she did not want the father's assistance in raising the child 
and that friend then communicated that information to the father. A similar situation 
was found in Burrow v. Vrontikas. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Burrow, 
the Utah Court of Appeals found that, because a mother delayed filing a paternity 
action for seven years and communicated to a mutual friend that she wanted nothing 
to do with the father and would raise the child herself, and that information was then 
communicated to the father, the doctrine of laches and/or estoppel applied to 
preclude the mother from recovering child support. In Brixen & Christopher. 
Architects v. Elton. 777 P.2d 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals 
held that developers were estopped from denying that architects' services were 
authorized when the developers (a) orally approved the architects' plans; (b) failed to 
object to the architects' work; and (c) admitted periodically that the work was good 
and money was owing to the architects for their services. 
In the present case, Wife's failure to respond to the July 31, 1992 letter from 
Husband's attorney, which was the first communication to Wife expressing Husband's 
understanding of their oral agreement, was not sufficient to justify Husband's 
subsequent conduct. Wife's understanding of the parties' agreement was that, 
because Husband had not paid her $10,000.00 as her share of the equity due by 
March 1989, her share of the equity would be one-half of the net equity in the home, 
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as provided in the decree of divorce. At no time did Wife communicate to Husband 
or any other person that she believed any differently. 
Husband further argues that he acted to his detriment based on Wife's 
silence, and that Wife's claims should therefore be estopped. In Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), a father claimed that, by purchasing an expensive car and 
moving to an expensive apartment, he substantially changed his position due to his 
reliance on the mother's agreement to release him from support obligations. The 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
Neither is there any satisfactory showing that the defendant made 
any substantial change in his position because of reliance on the 
facts he claims constituted the estoppel. This requirement is not 
satisfied by the mere fact that he indulged in the pleasant and 
euphoric assumption that he would not have to meet his obligations 
and that he bought a more expensive car and moved to a more 
expensive apartment. Likewise, the mere passage of time, or the 
failure of a creditor (plaintiff) to bedevil the debtor for payment 
does not create an estoppel. 
Id. at 144 (citation omitted). 
Husband's understanding of the parties' oral agreement was contrary to the 
express language of the decree, and it was his responsibility to ensure clarification of 
any agreement with terms contrary to the decree. Husband held an unjustified 
assumption that the parties' oral agreement, without more, was sufficient to relieve 
him of his obligations under the decree of divorce. Husband failed to put his 
understanding of the agreement in writing and secure Wife's affirmative acceptance 
of that agreement, nor did Husband seek a modification of the decree of divorce 
changing the terms of the original decree. Accordingly, Husband had no legal basis 
for believing the parties' oral agreement should take precedence over the terms of 
the decree itself. 
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POINT III 
WIFE'S CLAIMS WERE NOT BARRED BY LACHES 
Husband argues that his obligation to pay Wife her portion of the equity 
matured in March, 1989 and that Wife's failure to enforce that claim for over five 
years should result the barring of her claim via Husband's allegation of laches. 
Husband argues that Wife exercised a lack of diligence in pursuing her claim. 
The plain language of the decree of divorce states that, "[i]n the event [the 
$10,000.00] is not paid [by March 1989], the parties are to sell the home and the net 
equity is to be divided between the parties." The clear meaning of this provision is 
that Wife is entitled to one-half of any appreciated value of the home accrued 
between March 1989 and the date the home is sold. The decree of divorce does not 
state a specific time after March 1989 within which the net equity should be divided 
between the parties. By delaying payment to Wife of her share of the equity, either 
by buying out her equity or by selling the home, Husband took the risk of having to 
pay Wife a greater amount as her share of the equity due to appreciation over time. 
Husband cannot argue that paying Wife's high-interest credit card debts over 
a lengthy period of five years is an acceptable way to pay her a portion of her equity 
in the home and simultaneously argue that Wife should be prevented from seeking 
the additional equity due her under the decree of divorce which results from that 
same delay. As Husband points out, "[l]aches is not mere delay, but delay that works 
a disadvantage to another. To constitute laches, two elements must be established: 
(1) The lack of diligence on the part of [one party]; (2) An injury to [the other party] 
owing to such lack of diligence." Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. 
Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). 
In the case now before this Court, which party was be more injured by the 
other's delay? Does not Husband's lack of diligence in paying Wife her share of the 
equity in the home result in significant injury to Wife? The trial court clearly found 
that Husband was receiving the benefit of the home and the benefit of the use of 
Wife's $10,000.00 while only making payments on Wife's high-interest credit cards. If 
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the trial court had held Wife to only $10,000.00 equity, there would have been no 
benefit to Wife whatsoever by virtue of the parties' agreement. 
It is apparent that the trial court adequately addressed the issue of laches 
and determined that Wife had been more injured than Husband by the delay in 
dividing the equity, and that following the express language of the decree of divorce 
was the only way to provide an equitable resolution to this dispute. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING THE HOME 
TO BE VALUED AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING 
Husband argues that Wife's inaction in seeking enforcement of the decree of 
divorce has unfairly rewarded her by granting Wife the full benefit of all appreciation 
in the home valued at the time of sale or appraisal. Husband argues that the equity 
in the home should be split as of March 1989 or, at a minimum, as of July 31, 1992, 
the date of the letter from Husband's attorney to Wife detailing Husband's 
understanding of the parties' oral agreement. 
The arguments set forth above illustrate that Wife was not solely at fault in 
failing to seek enforcement or modification of the divorce decree and that the delay 
in dividing the equity has injured Wife as much, if not more, than Husband. Husband 
negotiated with Wife to make her credit card payments as offset against the equity 
rather than paying Wife a lump sum at the time the $10,000.00 became due and 
payable to Wife; Husband took no action at that time to pay Wife the difference 
between the $10,000.00 amount and the amount owing on the credit cards; and 
Husband failed to seek a modification of the decree of divorce clarifying the parties' 
oral agreement. His actions throughout have indicated a reluctance to sell the home 
and an ongoing refusal or inability to pay Wife her share of the equity, even at the 
lower amount of $10,000.00, and Husband's delaying tactics have been to Wife's 
detriment. 
The plain meaning of the divorce decree is that the net equity is to be 
divided between the parties when the home is sold. Husband was aware of this 
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provision in the decree and, given his own inaction in this matter, has no legal basis 
for now arguing that Wife should be held to a lesser portion of the equity than that 
existing at the time of sale or appraisal, as ordered by the trial court. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT 
ARE BASED ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The decree of divorce clearly states that, if by March 1989 Husband fails to 
pay Wife $10,000.00 as her share of the equity in the home, the home shall be sold 
and the net equity divided between the parties. The decree does not state that Wife's 
share of the equity shall be fixed at $10,000.00 regardless of when Husband chooses 
to pay Wife; rather, any delay in paying Wife the $10,000.00 equity determined as of 
the date of the decree entitled Wife to increased equity in accordance with the 
home's increase in value over time. 
Pursuant to Utah law, the abilities of divorcing parties to resolve issues 
related to the divorce by private contract shall be subject to court approval: 
The marriage itself and the obligations inherent in it are matters 
which it has always been recognized cannot be left entirely to 
private contract. This applies also to the property rights of the 
parties because their welfare, and to some degree the public 
welfare, is involved. That is one of the reasons that public sanction, 
through the court, must be obtained for what is done. 
The parties cannot by contract completely defeat the authority 
expressly conferred upon the court by . . . statute . . ., in cases of 
divorce, to "make such orders in relation to . . . property . . . as may 
be equitable." Under it there can be no doubt of the court's 
prerogative to make whatever disposition of the property, including 
the rights in such a contract, as it deems fair, equitable and 
necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties. 
Mathie v. Mathie. 363 P.2d 779, 784 (Utah 1961). 
Wife's conduct over the years has been in complete accordance with the 
plain language of the decree, and the trial court's findings indicate that it agreed with 
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Wife's understanding of the decree. Husband's conduct has been contrary to the 
plain language of the decree and, without having modified the decree or having clear 
evidence as to Wife's intention to accept less than she was entitled to under the terms 
of the decree, he should not at this late date be able to avoid the consequences of his 
own inaction. The decision of the trial court, made in accordance with the terms of 
the original decree, should be affirmed. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES CONCERNING THE AMOUNT 
OF WIFE'S EQUITY IN THE HOME 
Contradictory evidence was presented to the trial court concerning the 
amount of equity to which the parties believed Wife was entitled. Husband testified 
that he understood the parties' oral agreement allowed him to pay Wife's credit card 
debts and offset those payments against the $10,000.00 equity specified in the decree 
if Wife's equity were paid by March 1989. Wife testified that she understood that 
Husband's credit card payments would be offset against whatever net equity was due 
her, since her share of the equity had not been paid out by March 1989. 
Because there was no evidence before the trial court to show the parties ever 
had a meeting of the minds as to the amount of equity due to Wife, the trial court 
was correct in following the language of the decree of divorce and this decision 
should be upheld on appeal. 
POINT VII 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS UNREASONABLE FOR 
HUSBAND TO MAINTAIN THAT WIFE AGREED TO 
ACCEPT ONLY $10,000.00 OF EQUITY FROM THE HOME 
AND SHOULD BE HELD TO THAT AMOUNT 
Reason dictates that Wife would not have knowingly made the agreement as 
understood by Husband. The decree provided for a greater amount of equity to be 
payable to Wife if Husband failed to pay Wife $10,000.00 by March 1989 and if the 
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Wife's share of the net equity received from the subsequent sale of the home 
exceeded $10,000.00. Wife could have paid her own credit card debts in one payment 
if Husband had paid her the $10,000.00 by March 1989, thereby retaining the amount 
Husband paid in interest over a period of five years. 
It is unreasonable for Husband to argue that Wife willingly agreed to deduct 
the amount of interest on her credit card debts from the $10,000.00 amount. Not 
only would Wife have lost the amount of the interest paid on the credit card debts, 
but she would have lost the amount of interest she could have accumulated on the 
$10,000.00 during that same five-year period. The only reasonable explanation for 
Wife's willingness to accept Husband's offer to pay her credit card debts is that Wife 
believed she would ultimately be entitled to a greater amount of equity as 
compensation. Even when Husband's understanding of the parties' agreement was 
communicated to Wife through the July 31, 1992 letter from Husband's attorney, Wife 
had no reason to believe that Husband's mistaken understanding would prevail over 
the express language of the decree. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the lower court's decision was 
reasonable and equitable and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case shows that the parties attempted to modify, by oral 
agreement, certain provisions of the decree of divorce. However, the evidence 
further shows that the parties never had a meeting of the minds as to certain material 
elements of that agreement, and the trial court correctly resolved this dispute by 
following the express language of the decree and providing that Husband be allowed 
to take certain offsets against the amount of equity owed to Wife. This Court should 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Dated this Z J ^ r d a y of A ^ , 1996. 
DANA D. BURROWS v ° 
Attorney for Appellee 
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